# 1

#### A. Decreasing authority requires reducing the permission to act, not the ability to act.

Taylor, 1996 (Ellen, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online)

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

#### B. Violation: the aff merely involves legislative consultation—doesn’t restrict permission to act

#### C. Reasons to vote neg:

#### 1.) Ground: we lose specific DAs, CPs, Ks to actually limiting the president’s war powers authority

**2.) Precision – mooting a word in the resolution is incoherent – destroys predictable limits because the AFF can ignore key words in the resolution. An accurate reading of the resolution inherently produces a more limiting topic**

#### D) Voting issue: Fairness, Education, Ground.

# 2

#### \*President Obama should sign an executive order clarifying that the United States will not respond to cyber-attacks with nuclear weapons.

#### \*The United States federal government should fully fund micro-grid technologies.

#### \*The United States federal government should fund architectural alternatives for satellites to move to smaller and simpler systems:

#### The counterplan solves all of the AFF escalation scenarios—it’s what their authors advocate:

Richard A. Clarke and Steven Andreasen, AFF Authors, 6/14/2013 (special adviser to the president for cybersecurity in the George W. Bush administration & National Security Council's staff director for defense policy and arms control from 1993 to 2001, “Cyberwar’s threat does not justify a new policy of nuclear deterrence,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cyberwars-threat-does-not-justify-a-new-policy-of-nuclear-deterrence/2013/06/14/91c01bb6-d50e-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html>, Accessed 2/9/2014, rwg)

The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board concluded this year that China and Russia could develop capabilities to launch an “existential cyber attack” against the United States — that is, an attack causing sufficient damage that our government would lose control of the country. “While the manifestation of a nuclear and cyber attack are very different,” the board concluded, “in the end, the existential impact to the United States is the same.”¶ Because it will be impossible to fully defend our systems against existential cyberthreats, the board argued, the United States must be prepared to threaten the use of nuclear weapons to deter cyberattacks. In other words: I’ll see your cyberwar and raise you a nuclear response.¶ Some would argue that Obama made clear in his 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviewthat the United States has adopted the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attacks the “sole purpose” of our nuclear weapons. Well, the board effectively reviewed the fine print and concluded that the Nuclear Posture Review was “essentially silent” on the relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons and cyberthreats, so connecting the two “is not precluded in the stated policy.”¶ As the board noted, cyberattacks can occur very quickly and without warning, requiring rapid decision-making by those responsible for protecting our country. Integrating the nuclear threat into the equation means making clear to any potential adversary that the United States is prepared to use nuclear weapons very early in response to a major cyberattack — and is maintaining nuclear forces on “prompt launch” status to do so.¶ Russia and China would certainly take note — and presumably follow suit. Moreover, if the United States, Russia and China adopted policies threatening an early nuclear response to cyber­attacks, more countries would surely take the same approach.¶ It’s hard to see how this cyber-nuclear action-reaction dynamic would improve U.S. or global security. It’s more likely to lead to a new focus by Pentagon planners on generating an expanding list of cyber-related targets and the operational deployment of nuclear forces to strike those targets in minutes.¶ Against that backdrop, maintaining momentum toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’ national security strategy (and that of other nations) — a general policy course pursued by the past five presidents — would become far more difficult. Further reductions in nuclear forces and changes in “hair-trigger” postures, designed to lessen the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch, would also probably stall.¶ Fortunately, Obama has both the authority and the opportunity to make clear that he meant what he said when he laid out his nuclear policy in Prague in 2009. For decades, presidential decision directives have made clear the purpose of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and provided broad guidance for military planners who prepare the operations and targeting plans for our nuclear forces. An update to existing presidential guidance is one of the homework items tasked by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.¶ Cyberthreats are very real, and there is much we need to do to defend our military and critical civilian infrastructure against what former defense secretary Leon E. Panetta referred to as a “cyber Pearl Harbor” — including enhancing the ability to take action, when directed by the president, against those who would attack us. We also need more diplomacy such as that practiced by Obama with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, at their recent summit. Multinational cooperation centers could ultimately lead to shared approaches to cybersecurity, including agreements related to limiting cyberwar.¶ U.S. cyber-vulnerabilities are serious, but equating the impact of nuclear war and cyberwar to justify a new nuclear deterrence policy and excessive Cold War-era nuclear capabilities goes too far. It diminishes the unique threat of national devastation and global extinction that nuclear weapons represent, undermines the credibility of nuclear deterrence by threatening use for lesser contingencies and reduces the urgency for focused action to lessen nuclear dangers. Excessive rhetoric on the threat of cyberwar from the United States and blurring the distinction between cyber and nuclear attacks just makes progress toward cyber-peace more difficult.¶ With a stroke of his pen and his speech in Berlin, Obama can keep the United States from uploading the cyber-nuclear link.

#### Micro-grids solves the AFF’s grids scenario:

Rona Cohen, 11/5/2013 (staff writer, “In the Quest for a More Resilient Grid, Microgrids Offer Solutions,” [http://stateenergyreport.com/2013 /11/05/in-the-quest-for-a-more-resilient-grid-microgrids-offer-solutions/](http://stateenergyreport.com/2013%20/11/05/in-the-quest-for-a-more-resilient-grid-microgrids-offer-solutions/), Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

In nine small towns, cities, and universities across Connecticut, an experiment is under way to create a more resilient electricity grid of the future.¶ Through an $18 million microgrid pilot, the first-ever statewide program of its kind, officials have enlisted a mix of public and private entities to test engineering approaches that will enable their buildings to maintain power during an outage by isolating them from the main electricity grid.¶ Among the participants are a hospi­tal, a gas station, emergency operations centers, and city halls—purveyors of the types of critical services that repeatedly went dark in large swaths of the state during the prolonged power failures caused by Hurricane Sandy and other massive storms in the last three years.¶ Microgrids are not new; they have supplied power in developing coun­tries where the local utility is unable to provide reliable service to customers, on university campuses, and increasingly, on military installations. More recently, their ability to keep electricity flowing to designated facilities even when the main grid is down has grabbed the attention of state policymakers who are searching for strategies to fortify their communities against future storm events.¶ Though definitions vary, microgrids are typically described as small-scale, integrated electricity generation and distribution systems fueled by on-site energy sources that can operate on their own, in “island” mode, inde­pendent of a broader grid. Microgrids can be designed to serve one facility, a large campus, or a few city blocks. One historical example of a microgrid is a navy ship, which runs on its own self-contained power source. In recent times, modern microgrids have incor­porated increasingly smarter controls that can integrate several forms of generation and shift loads depend­ing on need. These advances offer the promise of addressing a range of policy objectives, depending on the demands of a community.¶ “We think this is breaking through to a new model, a new approach to what the electricity system of the twenty-first century is going to look like,” said Daniel Esty, commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, which is overseeing the state’s microgrid pilot.¶ Microgrids, he said, offer Connect­icut and other states the promise of achieving goals beyond resiliency, such as encouraging cleaner energies, because of their ability to utilize a mix of less-polluting options than tradi­tional diesel backup generation.¶ A Focus on Combined Heat and Power¶ Some of the projects in the Connecticut pilot will incorporate combined heat and power (CHP) fueled by natural gas, which can be nearly twice as efficient as a conventional system and release fewer emissions. The systems have on-site electrical genera­tors that capture the waste heat that is a by-product of electricity produc­tion and use it to provide steam or hot water to a facility for heating or cool­ing. CHP systems can be configured to supply uninterrupted heat and cooling to a building, even when the grid goes down.¶ Example of an Energy Surety Microgrid for military bases. The microgrid favors small generation units with storage near living and working areas, and relies less on big remote power plants. Illustration courtesy of Lisa Sena-Henderson/Sandia National Labs¶ Example of an Energy Surety Microgrid for military bases. The microgrid favors small generation units with storage near living and working areas, and relies less on big remote power plants. Illustration courtesy of Lisa Sena-Henderson/Sandia National Labs¶ During Sandy, that ability to “island” proved to be a lifeline for a handful of CHP-powered buildings in New York City that stayed up and running when much of the metropolitan area went dark. At the height of the storm, more than 2 million customers throughout the state lost power. In a post-storm analysis of 24 CHP systems, the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) found that at facilities whose CHP unit was designed to operate during a grid outage, not a single system went down, according to a study prepared by ICF International for Oak Ridge National Laboratory in March.¶ State officials are looking to speed the adoption of CHP systems. Last February, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo announced $20 million in funding to support CHP projects designed to supply continuous power and heat during outages. The announcement followed recommendations from a commission the governor convened last year, which released a report in January calling for an acceleration of microgrid development as a key component of resiliency planning.¶ “Governor Cuomo has called for making the state’s infrastructure more resilient in the face of extreme weather like we witnessed with Hurricane Sandy. Through the use of combined heat and power technology, building owners can make that happen,” said Francis J. Murray Jr., president and CEO of NYSERDA, in a statement announcing the program.¶ New Jersey has authorized a $25 million program to promote the use of CHP and fuel cells among any governmental, commercial, institutional, or industrial entity in the state. Officials are also partnering with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and New Jersey Transit to develop an advanced microgrid to power the busy rail hubs in Newark, Hoboken, and Jersey City so they can operate independently if the main grid fails. Among the power sources being considered are CHP and renewables, said Bob Hwang, senior manager at Sandia National Laboratories, which will build the microgrid, during the project’s announcement on August 26.¶ DOE has for years conducted research and provided seed money to deploy microgrid technologies in universities, school districts, hospitals, businesses, and military bases throughout the country. One of its ongoing collaborators is the California Energy Commission, which has funneled a range of grants to local communities and universities to develop microgrids.

#### The counterplan solves the AFF—prevents disruption of space assets in a time of crisis:

Bill Gertz, 1/8/2014 (staff writer, “General: Strategic Military Satellites Vulnerable to Attack in Future Space War,” <http://freebeacon.com/general-strategic-military-satellites-vulnerable-to-attack-in-future-space-war/>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

To better protect satellites in a future conflict, the military is currently studying new ways of replacing or restructuring satellite systems, along with better methods to dissuade and deter enemies from attacking them.¶ The policy of loading large satellites with numerous types of sensors and missions worked well in the past. But in the new contested space environment, a new strategy and architecture are needed, Shelton said.¶ One new strategy advocated by the general calls for “architectural alternatives” that are currently being studied by both military and industry.¶ The new focus calls for shifting away from large, multiple-payload satellites in favor of a larger number of smaller and simpler systems, which would be less expensive and conform to the currently tight defense budgets.¶ “By distributing our space payloads across multiple satellite platforms, we increase our resiliency to the cheap shot or premature failure,” Shelton said. “At a minimum, it complicates our adversaries’ targeting calculus.”

# 3

#### Effort to sanction Iran has slowed down in the Congress now:

Gulf News, 2/18/2014 (“Further Iran sanctions would undermine efforts by int''l community, Rouhani – report,” <http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2361950&Language=en>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

WASHINGTON, Feb 18 (KUNA) -- A bipartisan report published by analysts with an independent non-profit group in the US said further sanctions on Iran will only undermine the diplomatic effort currently underway to curb the Islamic Republic's nuclear program.¶ "It is difficult to argue that a new sanctions bill is intended to support the negotiations when all the countries doing the negotiating oppose it," concluded the report by the Iran Project, a group that serves to bolster the US-Iran dialogue and educate members of Congress.¶ The document examined the pros and cons of the bill introduced in December by Senators Mark Kirk and Robert Menendez, a Republican and a Democrat, respectively. The bill seeks to increase sanctions as a way of pushing Iran to cooperate further with the international community.¶ But any such action "would feed an unwelcome narrative" to the other countries involved in the nuclear talks, and "the net result would be less pressure on Iran," said the report.¶ "It is very difficult to imagine that the sanctions bill would do anything but undermine Rouhani, as he attempts to steer Iran on a different path," it continued. "This is an assessment shared not only by Iran experts, and Iranian expats who have opposed the regime, but also by Israeli military intelligence, which has concluded that Rouhani may represent a fundamental shift in Iranian politics." The report also added that it would be "difficult to escape the conclusion that a new sanctions bill would increase the probability of war, even if it does not guarantee such an outcome." For now, the sanctions bill has slowed down in Congress as it undergoes another review, and more than 100 members of the House of Representatives - including some Republicans - signed a letter last week backing President Barack Obama's negotiation process with Iran.

#### B) Debates on the authority to use force take up enormous time & political energy:

Steve Vladeck, 3/14/2013 (staff writer, “Hard National Security Choices,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/drones-domestic-detention-and-the-costs-of-libertarian-hijacking/>, Accessed 8/19/2013, rwg)

But the cost to the government is also relevant. As last week demonstrates, government officials end up having to expend a remarkable amount of energy to either defend or reject the government’s authority to undertake conduct it would seldom (or never) attempt, and to then endure and be forced to respond to criticisms because it had the temerity to suggest that there might be exceptional circumstances where such uses of force might be permissible.¶ Ultimately, there are difficult and important conversations to have about current and future U.S. policy when it comes to, inter alia, targeted killings and detention. But if last week’s filibuster and accompanying public relations storm are any indication, the most visible libertarians in Congress don’t appear to be interested in having them. That’s certainly their prerogative. But in that case, we might all be better off if they let these conversations take place, rather than hijacking them and turning them into debates in which there is virtually no one on the other side–not because there’s nothing to their points, but because there’s so much more in what’s not being said.

#### C) **Obama ability to fight hard is key to fending off members of Congress wanting to impose sanctions:**

Dawn.com, 2/19/2014 (“Iran 'greatly concerned' by US sanctions talk, says Zarif,” <http://www.dawn.com/news/1087918/iran-greatly-concerned-by-us-sanctions-talk-says-zarif>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

VIENNA: Talk of new US sanctions in recent months has created “a great deal of concern” in Iran on whether Washington is serious about a nuclear deal, Iran's foreign minister said Tuesday.¶ “Unfortunately what we have seen in the last two months has not encouraged us to believe that everything is in order,” said Mohammad Javad Zarif, speaking from Vienna on the first day of nuclear talks.¶ “I can understand the politics... in the United States... but from the general perspective of the Iranian populace what has happened in the last two months has been less than encouraging,” he said.¶ Certain statements “have created a great deal of concern in Iran on whether the US is serious about wanting to reach an agreement”.¶ He added: “But nevertheless, these statements aside, it is really possible to make an agreement because of a single overriding fact, and that is that we have no other option.¶ “If we want to resolve this issue the only way is through negotiations,” he said, speaking from Vienna in a webcast discussion organised by Denver University's Center for Middle East Studies.¶ US President Barack Obama has had to fight hard to stop sceptical members of Congress, including some from his own party, from passing additional sanctions on the Islamic republic.

#### **D) New sanctions legislation risks a global nuclear war:**

Press TV, 11/13/2013 (“Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail,” http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says. “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war. White House press secretary Jay Carney called on Congress to allow more time for diplomacy as US lawmakers are considering tougher sanctions. "This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue," Carney said. "The American people do not want a march to war." Meanwhile, US Secretary of State John Kerry is set to meet with the Senate Banking Committee on Wednesday to hold off on more sanctions on the Iranian economy. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Kerry "will be clear that putting new sanctions in place would be a mistake." "While we are still determining if there is a diplomatic path forward, what we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause in sanctions. We are not taking away sanctions. We are not rolling them back," Psaki added. The analyst also noted that Israel and Saudi Arabia are “the usual suspects,” which are “working hand in hand to try to prevent” an interim nuclear agreement with Iran.

# 4

#### A. Their advocacy does not challenge the preconception that human problems are those worth solving – modern philosophical discussions are necessarily human-centered.

Singer ’89, Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University and Laureate Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne [All Animals Are Equal, TOM REGAN & PETER SINGER (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 148-162]

Experimenting on animals, and eating their flesh, are perhaps the two major forms of speciesism in our society. By comparison, the third and last form of speciesism is so minor as to be insignificant, but it is perhaps of some special interest to those for whom this article was written. I am referring to speciesism in contemporary philosophy. Philosophy ought to question the basic assumptions of the age. Thinking through, critically and carefully, what most people take for granted is, I believe, the chief task of philosophy, and it is this task that makes philosophy a worthwhile activity. Regrettably, philosophy does not always live up to its historic role. Philosophers are human beings, and they are subject to all the preconceptions of the society to which they belong. Sometimes they succeed in breaking free of the prevailing ideology: more often they become its most sophisticated defenders. So, in this case, philosophy as practiced in the universities today does not challenge anyone's preconceptions about our relations with other species. By their writings, those philosophers who tackle problems that touch upon the issue reveal that they make the same unquestioned assumptions as most other humans, and what they say tends to confirm the reader in his or her comfortable speciesist habits.

#### B. We must deny the urge to align ourselves with their human-centric politics – it is an all or nothing question.

Dell’Aversano ‘10 [Carmen, “the love whose name cannot be spoken: queering the human-animal bond” journal for critical animal studies, volume III issue 1 and 2, 2010]

A real ―oxymoronic community of difference‖, embracing not only all possible variants of ―gender trouble‖ but also the queering of the human-animal barrier, would not need to teach anybody anything, because it would have made violence unthinkable, since the human oppression of non-human animals is not a peripheral case of no political relevance but, as Zimbardo‘s own analysis of ―dehumanization‖ shows, the archetype, model and training ground of all forms of oppression and injustice.xxvi In this respect animal queer, more than any form of queer, radically threatens the very foundations of human society as we know it, since taking it seriously, not simply as another interesting category for academic analysis but as an ethical and political imperative, implies doing everything we can to dismantle the linguistic, conceptual and performative apparatus which makes all kinds of violence and oppression possible. In animal queer the dichotomy between liberation theory and civil right politics, which has been discussed at length in queer literature,xxvii has no substance: crossing the line dividing our species from the other ones means eradicating the very categories of thought needed to conceive of inequality and injustice. If the definition of queer politics is radical opposition to the established social order as such, and the measure of success of queer political action is the extent to which it smashes the system, then animal rights activism is the queerest possible form of political action, because it is structurally incompatible with continuing to live the way the system expects us to. The reason why animal queer is structurally and intrinsically subversive, and why it is perceived as radically threatening, and is, accordingly, ruthlessly marginalized, by all forms of cultural and political discourse, is that it replaces sameness with otherness as the criterion of emotional, social and political inclusion: whoever supports animals, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume VIII, Issue 1/2, 2010 (ISSN1948-352X) 101 fights for animals, loves an animal loves, supports and fights not for the self but for the other (―the wholly other that they call animal […]Yes, the wholly other, more other than any other, that they call an animal‖, as Derrida 1999 380 would put it), and knows in advance that no middle ground will ever be found, no assimilation will ever be possible, that in one, one hundred or one million years animals will be just as puzzling, as foreign, as alien to all that we can be and understand as they are now. If true love is felt not for the self but for the Other, and if ―[a]imer l‘autre, c‘est préserver son étrangeté, reconnaître qu‘il existe à côté de moi, loin de moi, non avec moi‖xxviii (Bruckner & Finkielkraut 1977 256), then love in its animal queer form is indeed the purest, most coherent and most radical form of love, and as such it has the potential not to reform society or to facilitate social ―progress‖ but to replace it with the unthinkable, with something radically contradicting all assumptions, expectations and definitions, to create the possibility of a happiness we can‘t even imagine, because to fathom it we would already have to be different from what we are, to have moved beyond ourselves.

#### C. Vote neg to reject the 1ac —maintaining the human-non-human binary dooms them to endless cycles of subordination and violence- this is also the site of protest that we should focus on

Best ’07, Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso [Steven, Charles Patterson, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust New York: Lantern Books, 2002, 280 pp]

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

# China

#### The AFF anti-China rhetoric masks the US hypocrisy in cyber-warfare:

John Glaser, 1/15/2014 (staff writer, “The Hypocritical US Position on Cyber-Warfare,”

<http://antiwar.com/blog/2014/01/15/the-hypocritical-us-position-on-cyber-warfare/>, Accessed 2/9/2014, rwg)

Granted, the Chinese engage in cyber-warfare against the U.S. as well, but to frame U.S. cyber operations against China as purely a response to Chinese cyber threats is disingenuous. There is documentation of U.S. cyber-warfare going back decades – and the U.S. has always been, needless to say, way ahead of China on this front, technologically speaking.¶ “U.S. intelligence services carried out 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011, the leading edge of a clandestine campaign that embraces the Internet as a theater of spying, sabotage and war,” The Washington Post reported in August, based on documents leaked by Edward Snowden. The key word there is “offensive.”¶ The hypocrisy of the official U.S. position on cyber-warfare is made clear in two recent Washington Post articles…¶ The Post reported in September 2012: “Cyberattacks can amount to armed attacks triggering the right of self-defense and are subject to international laws of war, the State Department’s top lawyer said Tuesday.”¶ And in August 2013: “The CIA and the NSA have begun aggressive new efforts to hack into foreign computer networks to steal information or sabotage enemy systems, embracing what the budget refers to as ‘offensive cyber operations.’”¶ Either Washington’s logic is airtight and they admit that China, Iran, and other countries targeted by our cyber-warfare now have the right to respond militarily in self-defense…or, the real logic is that the U.S. considers offensive cyber-warfare to be illegal for everyone except Uncle Sam. Which is it?

#### These reps make the threat a self-fulfilling prophecy:

**Pan 04’** – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics”, Alternatives RC)

China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, **empirically revealed by scientific means.** For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue **that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves** (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, **meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality**. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe**. In doing so**, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security. Finally, this article will illustrate some of the dangerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U.S.-China relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident.

 **(--) No cyber war with China—interdependence checks**

**Austin and Gady 2012**(Greg, professorial fellow at the EastWest Institute and senior visiting fellow in the department of War Studies at King’s College London, and Franz-Stefan, associate and foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute, "Cyber Detente Between the united States and China: Shaping the Agenda", http://www.ewi.info/system/files/detente.pdf)

That said**, the two countries’ economies, though very different in many respects, are each highly dependent on a global Internet and shared communications platforms** and hardware. While the Chinese economy is not as dependent on the Internet as the U.S., economy is, the difference between the two is fast shrinking. **China’s export-driven economy and its trade in financial services make it as vulnerable to cyber attack as the United States. This interdependence—despite occasional outbursts of confrontational rhetoric coming from both Beijing and Washington— can be leveraged to promote stability in bilateral relations.** In fact, **this is already happening. We can think of this interdependency as a bal-ance of cyber power. If one accepts that both governments make rational calculations, than this new interconnectedness can be exploited to make conflict less likely**. In today’s interconnected, digitalized world, the “opportunity cost” associated with embarking on a confrontational course will deter both parties from engaging in open hostile actions. This of course does not preclude cyber espionage, intellectual property theft, or even what some analysts have called the “long game,” i.e. the slow and gradual infiltration of strategically significant economic ICT systems by hackers on both sides.

#### (--) China won’t agree to cyber-operations norms:

Peter Lee, 2013 (staff writer, “China cyber-war: don't believe the hype,” <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-150313.html>, Accessed 9/18/2013, rwg)

Not unsurprisingly, post-Stuxnet the Chinese government has even less interest in the "Law of Armed Conflict in cyberspace" norms that the United States wants to peddle to its adversaries but apparently ignore when the exigencies of US interests, advantage, and politics dictate.

**(--) New doctrinal changes solve—especially in context of China**

**Austin 2012**(Greg, professorial fellow at the East West Institute, senior visiting fellow at King’s College, October 15, "America's Challenging Cyber Defense Policy", http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/10/15/americas-challenging-cyber-defense-policy/)

**The DoD foreshadowed some time ago that it would produce a new set of rules of engagement to cover cyber operations. Panetta has characterized this as “the most comprehensive change to our rules of engagement in cyberspace in seven years”. He said that these would make the “department more agile and provide us with the ability to confront major threats quickly**.” He foreshadowed strengthening of Cyber Command, a move reported by US sources to include having it stand alone as an independent unified command compared with its current position under Strategic Command. **This will be a positive move since it will disassociate it from its current co-location with the command responsible of strategic nuclear forces, a relationship that has caused China some considerable consternation.**

#### (--) US-China relations high – military co-op proves

Smith, 9/14/13 (Alexander, “Analysis: Superpower rivalry between US, China shows signs of softening,” http://behindthewall.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/09/14/20476425-analysis-superpower-rivalry-between-us-china-shows-signs-of-softening?lite, bgm)

The superpower rivalry between the U.S. and China is showing signs of softening, following a series of high-level military visits and plans for a rare joint naval exercise between the two nations next year. Washington invited Beijing to participate in the biennial Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), which has formerly included scenarios such as China itself launching an offensive against U.S. ally Taiwan. Hosted by the U.S., RIMPAC is the world's largest maritime training operation and features 22 countries. It will be the first time China has participated. A smaller joint navy exercise last week was the first time Chinese vessels had visited U.S. waters since 2006, The Associated Press reported. Three People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships carrying 680 officers and sailors performed drills on Sept. 6 with USS Lake Erie off Waikiki and Diamond Head, Honolulu. Two days later, Chinese Admiral Wu Shengli met U.S. Navy Chief of Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert in San Diego, home of the U.S. naval fleet. This followed up on a visit by Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan to the Pentagon in August. "Our goal is to build trust between our militaries through cooperation," Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel told reporters during Chang’s visit. The state-run China Daily newspaper characterized the admiral's visit to the U.S. as "a move experts described as part of the 'rare, determined and intensive efforts' by Beijing and Washington in recent months to improve military ties." The exchanges come as part of President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” policy, an eastern re-balancing of military might in the wake of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, which raised eyebrows in Beijing when it was unveiled last year. Stephen Orlins, president of New-York based National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, said the series of events has the potential to build a significant affiliation between the world’s two largest economies. “It is very meaningful, and it might be just the beginning,” said Orlins, who in 2011 led a delegation of U.S. members of Congress to visit a Chinese navy submarine, and has briefed U.S. naval personnel on China. “The question is: Are these just symbolic actions or are they actually substantive? Whether this is a new relationship between the U.S. and China will depend on actions by both states.” There have also been positive steps on the political front. During this year's meeting at Sunnylands, Calif., Obama and Xi Jinping, general secretary of China’s Communist Party, began to ameliorate recent hostilities over alleged cyber attacks by Chinese hackers. These events -- both military and political -- have huge symbolic value in China, Orlins said: “The meeting with Hagel made the papers in the U.S. but in China it was front-page news."

#### (--) Interdependence checks conflict b/n US & China:

Peter Lee, 2013 (staff writer, “China cyber-war: don't believe the hype,” <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-150313.html>, Accessed 9/18/2013, rwg)

Another such issue is cyber-security, which has become a growing challenge to our economic relationship as well. Economies as large as the United States and China have a tremendous shared stake in ensuring that the Internet remains open, interoperable, secure, reliable, and stable. Both countries face risks when it comes to protecting personal data and communications, financial transactions, critical infrastructure, or the intellectual property and trade secrets that are so vital to innovation and economic growth.

# Deterrence

#### (--) Cyber-war can’t shut down America’s grid:

Jazz Shaw, 9/15/2013 (staff writer, “Is cyberwar just a myth?”

<http://hotair.com/archives/2013/09/15/is-cyberwar-just-a-myth/>, Accessed 9/19/2013, rwg)

This seems to match what I found out when I had the chance to speak with a software engineer this summer who has been working on Smart Grid technology in both New Jersey and Ohio. She told me that while there are definite concerns to watch out for, hackers looking to wreak such havoc have a much tougher task than simply finding some deeply hidden password from a secret decoder ring in the right box of cereal and shutting down America’s electricity for months or years on end as in NBC’s series, Revolution.¶ The problem for the hackers, as she explained, is twofold. First, Smart Grids rely largely on what’s described as “hard triggers” rather than software control. Before an event takes place – such as isolating a particular grid by cutting the lines to prevent a rolling brownout – there has to be an actual failure of the power on the other side of the grid line. In other words, to produce a given physical result, you need to trigger another actual physical condition first, rather than sending some remote computer command to make it happen. Its apparently much harder than it sounds.¶ Second, the ironic thing that could potentially save us from that sort of infrastructure attack is that so much of our grid is still “dumb” rather than smart. The vast majority of America’s power transmission system is really still nothing more than “wires hanging on sticks,” as some Smart Grid supporters like to say. There simply is no computer interface capable of shutting it off, so there’s nothing to hack into. Yes, individual power generating stations might be briefly shut down through a computer attack, but those tend to be isolated quickly and manually restored to operational status in short order.¶ So what do you think? Are we overthinking this and spending too much time and resources worrying about something which is more hype than horror? Or is cyberwar really lurking out there and waiting to shut down our way of life?

#### (--) New grants make the grid resilient:

Thomas Melville, 10/24/2013 (staff writer, “Keeping the U.S. energy grid safe, <http://www.energydigital.com/renewable_energy/keeping-the-us-energy-grid-safe>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has granted 11 awards totaling approximately $30 million for the development of new tools and technologies to strengthen protection of the nation’s electric grid and oil and gas infrastructure from cyber-attack, including an award of $3.25 million to ViaSat Inc.¶ The company will work closely with Southern California Edison and a large utility headquartered in the South to investigate, develop, and deploy an enhancement to ViaSat’s critical infrastructure protection system that incorporates policy-based automated responses to cyber events, increasing the resiliency of transmission and distribution networks.¶ The cybersecurity system focuses on securing utilities’ operational grids, enabling energy, water, oil and gas, and transportation operations crews to manage security through a virtual display of the network. The system implements an authenticated and encrypted “security fabric” that protects machine to machine communications between devices, and provides grid operators with the ability to visualize the security state of the system. Sensors continually update the information in real time, creating a hierarchical view that operators can use to identify issues, then drill down to individual nodes to contain or fix problems as they arise.¶ Augments Traditional IT Security¶ Traditional IT approaches have not adequately addressed the real-time control systems in the operational grid. ViaSat infrastructure protection provides these added benefits:¶ - Cyber-defense in depth by applying as an overlay to the best IT system security using firewalls, intrusion detection, deep packet inspection, analytics, network segmentation, device identity management and authentication, and other techniques.¶ - Policy based management to define/model appropriate device behavior, govern response to significant events, and other systems management features.¶ - Common operational picture of cybersecurity health for rapid network security fault assessment, analysis, and incident response.¶ - Integrates with additional systems such as physical security, physical access control, and user access control to make grid operations more resilient and reliable.

#### (--) Meltdown damage is nothing—practically no one will die—also disproves their coal internal link:

Will Boisvert, 8/8/2012 (“Fukushima Update: How Safe Can a Nuclear Meltdown Get?”

<http://slackwire.blogspot.com/2012/08/fukushima-update-how-safe-can-nuclear.html>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

Anti-nuke commentators like Arnie Gundersen continue to issue forecasts of a million or more long-term casualties from Fukushima radiation. (So far there have been none.) But the emerging scientific consensus is that the long-term health consequences of the radioactivity, particularly cancer fatalities, will be modest to nil. At the high end of specific estimates, for example, Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel, writing in the nuke-dreading Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, reckons an eventual one thousand fatal cancers arising from the spew.¶ Now there’s a new peer-reviewed paper by Stanford’s Mark Z. Jacobson and John Ten Hoeve that predicts remarkably few casualties. (Jacobson, you may remember, wrote a noted Scientific American article proposing an all-renewable energy system for the world.) They used a supercomputer to model the spread of radionuclides from the Fukushima reactors around the globe, and then calculated the resulting radiation doses and cancer cases through the year 2061. Their result: a probable 130 fatal cancers, with a range from 15 to 1300, in the whole world over fifty years. (Because radiation exposures will have subsided to insignificant levels by then, these cases comprise virtually all that will ever occur.) They also simulated a hypothetical Fukushima-scale meltdown of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in California, and calculated a likely cancer death toll of 170, with a range from 24 to 1400.¶ To put these figures in context, pollution from American coal-fired power plants alone kills about 13,000 people every year. The Stanford estimates therefore indicate that the Fukushima spew, the only significant nuclear accident in 25 years, will likely kill fewer people over five decades than America’s coal-fired power plants kill every five days to five weeks. Worldwide, coal plants kill over 200,000 people each year—150 times more deaths than the high-end Fukushima forecasts predict over a half century.

#### Other nations won’t launch cyber-war against the US—they’ll assume US cyber-operations are as superior as our conventional advantage

Charles Dunlap, 2012 (Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, *Patriots Debate*, pg. 190)

Nevertheless, Baker argues that the cyber “offense must be powerful enough to deter every adversary with something to lose in cyberspace,” and implies that America cannot do that unless it jettisons efforts to observe to the law. Curiously, he offers little evidence of any insufficiency in U.S. cyber offensive potential. In truth, who is to say that existing U.S. offensive cyber capabilities, notwithstanding that they follow the law, are not more powerful than those of any potential adversary? More precisely, what adversary would assume the United States is deficient in this regard? What adversaries do know is that the U.S. military is the most powerful in the world, even though it always seeks to follow the law. Why would an adversary think that U.S. cyber weapons are not as devastating as those the American military operates in every other domain?

#### Cyber-attacks are difficult to mount and limited in their damage:

Thomas Rid, **3/20**12 (“Think Again: Cyberwar,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar#6>)

"A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath.

#### **Efforts to develop a hardened IT infrastructure protects our satellites:**

Defense Industry Daily, 6/14/2011 (“DoD Cybersecurity Spending: Where’s the Beef?” <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/cyber-security-department-defense-spending-06882/>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

In March 2011 testimony external link to the House Armed Services Committee, Alexander said the cyber command plans to develop a hardened IT infrastructure that involves the use of cloud computing and thin-client networks. This would involve the moving of programs and data away from desktops to a centralized configuration that would enable tighter controls over network access and reduce vulnerabilities.¶ Alexander told lawmakers:¶ “This architecture would seem at first glance to be vulnerable to insider threats–indeed, no system that human beings use can be made immune to abuse–but we are convinced the controls and tools that will be built into the cloud will ensure that people cannot see any data beyond what they need for their jobs and will be swiftly identified if they make unauthorized attempts to access data.”¶ Cybersecurity firms could have a role in helping the US Cyber Command implement this hardened IT infrastructure concept, particularly cloud computing and thin-client providers.¶ Contracts have already been awarded by the command to help it establish its current facilities. For example, in 2010 Booz Allen Hamilton received a $14.4 million contract to build the command’s control center, and Integral Systems won a contract external link to provide commercial satellite geolocation services for the command’s Global Satellite Communications Support Center. The center, located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, monitors commercial satellite communication teleports to detect deliberate interference with the satellites.

#### Nuclear accidents wouldn’t escalate

Waltz 95

Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995, p. 93-94

 “Love is like war,” the chaplain says in Bertolt Brecht’s Mother Courage, “it always finds a way.” For half a cen­tury, nuclear war has not found a way. The old saying, “accidents will happen,” is translated as Murphy’s Law holding that anything that can go wrong will go wrong. Enough has gone wrong, and Scott Sagan has recorded many of the nuclear accidents that have, or have nearly, taken place. Yet none of them has caused anybody to blow anybody else up. In a speech given to American scientists in 1960, C. P. Snow said this: “We know, with the certainty of statistical truth, that if enough of these weapons are made—by enough different states—some of them are going to blow up. Through accident, or folly, or madness—but the motives don’t matter. What does mat­ter is the nature of the statistical fact.” In 1960, statistical fact told Snow that within “at the most, ten years some of these bombs are going off.” Statistical fact now tells us that we are twenty-five years overdue. But the novelist and scientist overlooked the fact that there are no “statistical facts.”’ Half a century of nuclear peace has to be explained since divergence from historical experience is dramatic. Never in modern history, conventionally dated from 1648, have the great and major powers of the world en­joyed such a long period of peace. Scott Sagan empha­sizes the problems and the conditions that conduce to pessimism. I emphasize the likely solutions and the conditions that conduce to optimism, bearing in mind that nothing in this world is ever certain.

# 2NC CP EXTN

### Space

#### The counterplan makes space more resilient:

Air Force Space Command, 8/21/2013 (“Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures

<http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130821-034.pdf>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

G¶ iven the challenges of¶ a rapidly¶ changing security¶ and fiscal¶ environment,¶ new and innovative¶ approaches¶ to provide capability in an affordable way¶ merit¶ close¶ examination¶ . One response¶ to these changes¶ that secures capability for the Joint warfighter¶ and the nation is to seek¶ resilience in space systems.¶ With respect to satellite constellations and space architectures,¶ AFSPC/CC defined¶ resilience¶ as follows:¶ "Resiliency is the ability of a system architecture to continue providing required¶ capabilitie¶ s in the face of system failures, environmental challenges, or adversary¶ actions."¶ Disaggregat¶ ing¶ space¶ architectu¶ res¶ is¶ one¶ strategy¶ to improve¶ resiliency,¶ offer¶ ing a¶ means to¶ trade cost, schedule, performance, and risk to¶ increase¶ flexibility and¶ capabil¶ ity¶ survivability¶ .¶ To¶ establish a common lexicon, we are proposing the following definition of¶ space¶ d¶ isaggregation¶ :¶ “¶ T¶ he dispersion of¶ space¶ -¶ based¶ mission¶ s,¶ functions¶ or sensors across¶ multiple systems¶ spanning¶ one or more orbital plane, platform, host¶ or domain¶ .¶ ”¶

#### **The resilience created by the counterplan deters enemies from attacking our space assets:**

Air Force Space Command, 8/21/2013 (“Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures

<http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130821-034.pdf>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

Today, our current space architectures are vulnerable to attack.¶ Our a¶ dversary¶ ’s counterspace¶ capabilities¶ and actions continue to grow in sophistication, number and employment with the¶ intent to hold our space systems at risk.¶ If the premise is accepted that national security space¶ assets will someday be attacked, then we have¶ a¶ military¶ and moral¶ obligation¶ to examine¶ protective measures¶ that¶ minimize this risk and¶ protect our nation’s warfighters, citizens, and¶ economy¶ .¶ Standing still in an environment populated with intelligent adversaries seeking to¶ contest our¶ leadership¶ in space and the¶ operational adv¶ antages it affords is a strategy for falling¶ behind.¶ Disaggregation¶ is¶ an¶ innovative opportunity to¶ stay ahead of¶ our adversaries¶ , to change¶ their¶ targeting¶ calculus, and to mitigate the¶ effects of a widespread attack on our space assets¶ .¶ In addition, r¶ e¶ silience serve¶ s¶ as¶ a¶ deterren¶ t,¶ which may be the best way to preserve our¶ capability by¶ avoiding an attack.

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### AT l to ptix

#### Executive action avoids politics

Sovacool 9

Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool 2009 is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization., Kelly E. Sovacool is a Senior Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of SingaporeArticle: Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 2009 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333,

¶ Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save ¶ ¶ presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horsetrading and compromise such legislative activity entails.¶ ¶ 292¶ ¶ Speediness of implementation can be especially important when challenges require rapid and decisive action. After the September ¶ ¶ 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, for ¶ ¶ instance, the Bush Administration almost immediately passed ¶ ¶ Executive Orders forcing airlines to reinforce cockpit doors and ¶ ¶ freezing the U.S. based assets of individuals and organizations ¶ ¶ involved with terrorist groups.¶ ¶ 293¶ ¶ These actions took Congress ¶ ¶ nearly four months to debate and subsequently endorse with ¶ ¶ legislation. Executive Orders therefore enable presidents to ¶ ¶ rapidly change law without having to wait for congressional action ¶ ¶ or agency regulatory rulemaking.

#### Backlash against Obama on executive action won’t gain traction

Ramsey 12

(MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, is Professor of Law at the University of San Diego School of Law, “THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY NATIONAL LAWYERS CONVENTION--2011: MEET THE NEW BOSS: CONTINUITY IN PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS?” Summer, 2012, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, LexisNexis, KB)

Thus there has been an escalation in the use of unconstitutional executive war power under President Obama, yet there has not been an outcry against him resembling the outcry against the Bush Administration, which was routinely attacked for exceeding the limits of executive power. n29 Although some voices have been raised against President Obama's claims of executive power, n30 they have been marginalized. They have not [\*871] been taken up by the mainstream in the manner of similar criticisms of President Bush. My speculation is that there is an identification by legal and media elites with the establishment Democratic Party that makes it difficult for these criticisms to gain traction in the way they did in the Bush Administration.¶ I think this makes it easier for Democratic presidents than for Republican presidents to unconstitutionally extend executive power. Thus Obama's policies, which are much more deserving of constitutional criticism, do not generate the popular pushback that we saw, perhaps unjustifiably, against President Bush. In any event, what is most striking about executive war power under President Obama is not the commonly recognized continuity as compared to the prior administration, but rather the increased disregard of constitutional limits.

#### Their evidence doesn’t assume foreign policy which is uniquely shielded from backlash

Moe and Howell 99

(Terry Moe, William Bennett Munro professor of political science at Stanford University, a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and a member of the Hoover Institution’s Koret Task Force on K-12, William Howell, the Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics in the Harris School, a professor in the Department of Political Science and the College, and a co-director of the Program on Political Institutions, “The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action” 1999, Oxford University Press, <http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org.ezproxy.baylor.edu/content/15/1/132.full.pdf>, KB)

Yet statutory constraint cannot be counted upon to work especially well as¶ a check on unilateral action by presidents. In the ﬁrst place, legislators may¶ actually prefer broad delegations of authority on many occasions, granting presidents substantial discretion to act unilaterally. This can happen, for instance,¶ (1) when their policy goals are similar to those of presidents, (2) when they are¶ heavily dependent on the expertise and experience of the administration, (3)¶ when they want to avoid making conflictual decisions within the legislature,¶ and thus ﬁnd it attractive to “shill the responsibility" to the executive, (4) when¶ Congress, as a collective institution, really doesn't have speciﬁc preferences¶ and can only decide on the broad outlines of a policy, (5) when, in complex pol-¶ icy areas with changing environments, it is impossible to design a decent policy¶ that promises to meet its objectives unless substantial authority is delegated¶ to the executive, and (6) when certain policies require speed, ﬂexibility, and¶ secrecy if they are to be successful (Moe, 1990, 1998; Epstein and O'l-ialloran,¶ I999). Most of these conditions, we should point out, are more likely to be met in foreign rather than domestic policy, so there is good reason to expect broad¶ delegations to be more common in that realm.

#### CP preserves PC - avoids having to rally and compromise

Howell ’05

(William, Associate Prof @ Harvard, “Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview”, September 2005, Presidential Quarterly, <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2005.00258.x>)

The actions that Bush and his modern predecessors have taken by fiat do not fit easily within a theoretical framework of executive power that emphasizes weakness and dependence, and offers as recourse only persuasion. For at least two reasons, the ability to act unilaterally is conceptually distinct from the array of powers presidents rely upon within a bargaining framework. First, **when presidents act unilaterally, they move policy first and thereby place upon Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape.** If they choose not to retaliate, either by passing a law or ruling against the president, then the president's order stands. Only by taking (or credibly threatening to take) positive action can either adjoining institution limit the president's unilateral powers. Second, when the president acts unilaterally, he acts alone. Now of course, he relies upon numerous advisers to formulate the policy, to devise ways of protecting it against congressional or judicial encroachment, and to oversee its implementation (more on this below). **But in order to issue the actual policy, the president need not rally majorities, compromise with adversaries, or wait for some interest group to bring a case to court. The president, instead, can strike out on his own**. Doing so**, the modern president is in a unique position to lead, to break through the stasis that pervades the federal government, and to impose his will in new areas of governance.**

#### Empirics are on our side

Warshaw ’06

(Shirley Anne, Prof of Pol. Science @ Gettysburg College, “Administrative Strategies of President George W. Bush” Extensions Journal, Spring 2006, <http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/extensions/spring2006/Warshaw.pdf>)

However, in recent administrations, particularly **since the Reagan administration**, **presidents have often bypassed Congress using administrative actions. They have opted for a strategy through administrative actions that is less time-consuming and clearly less demanding of their political capital.** Using an array of both formal and informal executive powers, **presidents have effectively directed the executive departments to implement policy without any requisite congressional authorization**. In effect, presidents have been able to govern without Congress. **The arsenal** of administrative actions available to presidents **includes the power of appointment, perhaps the most important of the arsenal, executive orders**, executive agreements, proclamations, signing statements, and a host of national security directives.1 More than any past president, George W. Bush has utilized administrative actions as his primary tool for governance.

# 2NC China War

### Extensions #1: Interdepedence Checks

#### (--) Extend our Austin & Gady evidence: interdependence checks a cyber-war between the US & China—the two countries simply have too much at stake in the cyber-realm to let it get out of control.

#### (--) Interdependence checks conflict b/n US & China:

Peter Lee, 2013 (staff writer, “China cyber-war: don't believe the hype,” <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-150313.html>, Accessed 9/18/2013, rwg)

Another such issue is cyber-security, which has become a growing challenge to our economic relationship as well. Economies as large as the United States and China have a tremendous shared stake in ensuring that the Internet remains open, interoperable, secure, reliable, and stable. Both countries face risks when it comes to protecting personal data and communications, financial transactions, critical infrastructure, or the intellectual property and trade secrets that are so vital to innovation and economic growth.

#### (--) No war – economic interdependence

#### Muego 7/23/12

**(Benjamin N Muego, visiting professor of Political Science to the Loyola Schools of the Ateneo de Manila University and a visiting professor of American and International Studies to De La Salle University in Manila, “US will not risk conflict with China,” 7/23/12, Business World Online,** <http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=US-will-not-risk-conflict-with-China&id=55610> /mr)

If “assistance” means sending an ultimatum to China to “cease and desist” her aggressive posturing in the disputed area, deploying military vessels to interdict or drive away Chinese ships, or perhaps act as some kind of an international gendarmerie, in support of the Philippines, then I am afraid that the answer is a resounding no. For one thing, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of which the United States is a major signatory, there is nothing in the language of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty which contemplates “automatic retaliation” in the event of an “external attack.” In contrast to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty which provides for “automatic retaliation” in the event of an external attack on any NATO member country, Article 5 of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty provides that any or all assistance a signatory might choose to undertake shall be made in accordance with “their Constitutional processes.” In the case of the United States, this would mean going to Congress to seek its approval or if necessary, ask for a declaration of war (under Article I of the US Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war), a virtually impossibility at the present time, given the prevailing mood in the federal legislature especially in the House of Representatives where the balance of power is held by 89 ultra-conservative and anti-Obama Tea Party members. Moreover, given widespread public disaffection over the war in Afghanistan and the Iraq War, I suggest that there is little if any public support for any new foreign military adventures, let alone against the most populous nation on earth.¶ Does this mean that the US will tamp down on her use of soft-power diplomacy including exhorting the Philippines and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members who claim certain portions of the Spratly Archipelago to take a unified stand and “speak with one voice,” as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham-Clinton urged ASEAN heads of state during the organization’s most recent meeting in Pnom Phenh, Cambodia or symbolic gestures like the recent visit of the CINCPAC, Admiral Samuel J Locklear, to the Philippines? No. Indeed, these initiatives are bound to continue into the indefinite future. But why is the US reluctant to up the ante, as it were, and for example,dispatch elements of the Seventh Fleet to the disputed waters to disperse the flotilla of Chinese fishing, naval and quasi-military vessels that have camped out in the area for several weeks now? Because to do so would be much too risky and is clearly not in the best “national interests” of the United States. It must be noted that the US has not only become China’s major trading partner and there are hundreds of billions of US investments in China; conversely, China has hundreds of billions of dollars of investments in the US in the form of bank deposits, treasury notes, bonds, stocks and other forms of commercial paper. Indeed, so extensive is the Chinese economic presence in the US that if China were to yank out a significant percentage of these investments, the US economy -- which is already in a rather precarious state -- could be sent into lethal tailspin.¶ But perhaps the major reason for the US’ reluctance to take on China in her own backyard is the fact that with her renewed economic clout -- having since dislodged Japan as the world’s second largest economic power -- China’s military capability and reach has grown dramatically in recent years as well. As the world’s dominant land power with nearly five million men and women under arms and several million more in reserve, in addition to being a full-fledged nuclear power, it would be the height of mendacity for the United States or any other country for that matter, located halfway around the globe,to engage China in a major land war in Asia. In fine, much as I would like to share the optimism of my students and friends, I am afraid that the scenario of the US coming to the rescue of the Philippines is unrealistic and a non-starter for one very simple and basic reason -- going to war with China or risking a serious rupture in Sino-American relations over the Spratly Archipelago is simply not in the “national interests” of the United States.

### Extensions #2: China Says No

#### (--) Extend our Lee evidence: our evidence says China won’t agree to any international norm on cyber-operations because it feels the US isn’t bargaining in good faith—the Stuxnet incident proves the US is willing to use offensive cyber-ops when it is in our interest.

**(--) No first use fails – China will say no.**

**Austin and Gady ‘12** (Greg (former Vice President for the Worldwide Security Initiative) and Franz-Stefan (fellow at the EastWest Institute, where he was a program associate and founding member of the Worldwide Cybersecurity Initiative), “CYBER Detente¶ BETWEEN THE UNITED¶ STATES AND CHINA:¶ SHAPING THE AGENDA”, EastWest Institute, 2012, RSR)

**A CICIR participant raised the issue of a “nofirst-¶ use” agreement** among major cyber¶ powers by referring to an American article on¶ the subject, **but a Chinese military source asserted¶ later to the authors of this paper that¶ such a position is not something that China¶ would officially endorse**. A CICIR participant¶ also raised the “idea of civilian sanctuaries,¶ and a prohibition of cyber attacks against¶ purely civilian targets.” In response, a CSIS¶ participant reverted to the view that the **existing¶ laws** of armed conflict, including the need¶ for proportionate response and discrimination¶ in targeting, **already provided the necessary¶ framework for protecting civilians, even¶ though the “line between civilian and military¶ infrastructure is blurred.”**

#### (--) Dialogue fails- US and China views on cyber capabilities are too far apart to overcome

Diane Bartz and Paul Eckert, 7-14-11 (“U.S. and China face vast divide on cyber issues”, Reuters)

For two years, academic experts from the United States and China have quietly held talks on cyber-security, straining to establish rules of the road in a realm that has proven a persistent irritant between the world's two largest economies.¶ The informal discussions have yielded modest progress in areas such as cooperation to combat Internet fraud, where both Beijing and Washington have an incentive to work together, according to participants.¶ But mostly, the talks appear to have exposed a wide gap between the United States and China over almost everything virtual: policing computer networks, moderating cyber warfare, even controlling information.¶ China's contrasting view of cyber security was made clear as soon as the United States began discussing the need to protect computer networks, James Mulvenon, a China expert at the Defense Group Inc, told a recent Washington conference.¶ China wanted to talk about censorship. "The Chinese came back immediately and said no, no, no, we want to talk about information security, which is both protecting the network and policing the content on the network," Mulvenon said.¶ "Right from the outset, we were talking past one another," he added.

### Extensions #4: No risk of a US-China War

#### (--) Extend our Kumar evidence—no risk of a US-Sino war—China has too many domestic problems to escalate a war—even if they try to win that the war would happen by accident—China wouldn’t escalate the accident…

#### (--) China is a peaceful power—no risk of a US-Sino war:

Rosecrance et al 10 (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

#### (--) No impact – China is rising peacefully, and their military buildup is not threatening.

Straits Times 08 “Why War is Unlikely in Asia” http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080625-72716.html

But the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is likely. First, a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions. Second, when we examine the Chinese military buildup, we find that there may be less there than some might have us believe. The Chinese war machine is not quite as threatening - although still worrisome - as some fear.

#### (--) China won’t go to war – no political will

Moore 6 (Scott, Research assistant, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_80.html, dw: 10-18-2006, da: 7-9-2011, lido)

The new generation of Chinese leaders, which has risen to power in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident (liu si), has tended to consist of moderate technocrats,[10] who are unlikely to support radical policy reversals, such as the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese politics in general have also evolved into a "more pragmatic, risk-adverse" form.[11] This process was initiated by the rise of "interest group politics" during the tenure of President Jiang Zemin.[12] This new structure of decision-making involves the specialization of bureaucratic institutions, which have become more assertive, and occasionally resisted high-level decisions they believed to be ill conceived.[13] It is probable that certain institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would strongly resist the actual or threatened use of nuclear weapons against the United States in almost any situation. In a risk-adverse policy environment that seeks consensus, this kind of strong opposition may well prevail. It thus appears unlikely that any impetus for the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the United States would come from within the established Chinese policymaking apparatus. There are suggestions, however, that pressure for the actual or threatened use of nuclear weapons against the United States may come from outside China's policymaking elite, via a phenomenon that may be termed "hyper-nationalism."[14] The gradual expansion of freedom of speech in China has revealed some truly radical nationalistic perspectives, ranging from a kind of Chinese lebensraum (sheng cun kong jian)[15] to allegations of a kind of racist plot in Western policy towards China.[16] In a crisis situation, there are suggestions that such hyper-nationalism may exert significant pressure on policymakers to respond with an aggressive response, which could include nuclear weapons.

### **Extensions: Relations High**

#### (--) Extend our SMITH relations high evidence—the recent high level talks between the US & China have softened the super-power rivalry…

#### **(--) Relations at its peak and momentum for improvement- St Petersburg meeting proves**

Yang 9/6/13 (Lina Yang: Editor for the English News in the Xinhuanet News, “Chinese VP meets US Congressmen” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-09/06/c\_132698988.htm)

Chinese President Xi Jinping and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama met here Friday for talks on bilateral ties and other issues of common concern.

Xi said the meeting reminded him of his last summit with Obama at the Annenberg estate in the U.S. state of California in June, where the two presidents reached important consensus on forging a new type of major-country relationship that features mutual respect and win-win cooperation."China and the United States have been working closely to implement the consensus reached at the summit," Xi said, citing achievements made at the fifth round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July.

China-U.S. relations have maintained sound development momentum, the Chinese president said, noting that the two countries have improved their military ties, deepened practical cooperation in all fields, and kept closer coordination on major international and regional issues.China attaches great importance to U.S. concerns over issues such as market access and intellectual property rights, and at the same time, the United States should ease its restrictions on high-tech exports to China and create a fair environment for Chinese investment in the United States, Xi added.

Obama, for his part, said that during the Annenberg summit, the two sides agreed to forge a new type of major-country relationship, expand practical cooperation and handle their differences constructively.

The U.S. president reaffirmed that his country welcomes China's peaceful development, hoping China will play a responsible role in the international community.

The United States and China have shared interests on many major global issues, he said, adding that Washington hopes to maintain military-to-military exchanges with Beijing and further enhance mutual trust.

# 2NC Meltdowns

### Extensions: Meltdown Defense

#### (--) Meltdowns only increase cancer risk by a tiny amount:

Will Boisvert, 8/8/2012 (“Fukushima Update: How Safe Can a Nuclear Meltdown Get?”

<http://slackwire.blogspot.com/2012/08/fukushima-update-how-safe-can-nuclear.html>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

Those numbers indicate that cancer risks in the immediate aftermath of a spew are tiny, even in very heavily contaminated areas. (Provided, always, that kids are kept from drinking iodine-contaminated milk.) Hasty evacuations are therefore needless. There’s time to make a considered decision about whether to relocate—not hours and days, but months and years.¶ And that choice should be left to residents. It makes no sense to roust retirees from their homes because of radiation levels that will raise their cancer risk by at most a few percent over decades. People can decide for themselves—to flee or not to flee—based on fallout in their vicinity and any other factors they think important. Relocation assistance should be predicated on an understanding that most places, even close to a stricken plant, will remain habitable and fit for most purposes. The vast “costs” of cleanup and compensation that have been attributed to the Fukushima accident are mostly an illusion or the product of overreaction, not the result of any objective harm caused by radioactivity.

#### (--) Risks of a meltdown are negligible:

Will Boisvert, 8/8/2012 (“Fukushima Update: How Safe Can a Nuclear Meltdown Get?”

<http://slackwire.blogspot.com/2012/08/fukushima-update-how-safe-can-nuclear.html>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

Ultimately, the key to rational policy is to understand the kind of risk that nuclear accidents pose. We have a folk-conception of radiation as a kind of slow-acting nerve gas—the merest whiff will definitely kill you, if only after many years. That risk profile justifies panicked flight and endless quarantine after a radioactivity release, but it’s largely a myth. In reality, nuclear meltdowns present a one-in-a-hundred chance of injury. On the spectrum of threat they occupy a fairly innocuous position: somewhere above lightning strikes, in the same ballpark as driving a car or moving to a smoggy city, considerably lower than eating junk food. And that’s only for people residing in the maximally contaminated epicenter of a once-a-generation spew. For everyone else, including almost everyone in Fukushima prefecture itself, the risks are negligible, if they exist at all.

#### Nuclear accidents are low-stake events:

Will Boisvert, 8/8/2012 (“Fukushima Update: How Safe Can a Nuclear Meltdown Get?”

<http://slackwire.blogspot.com/2012/08/fukushima-update-how-safe-can-nuclear.html>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

But there may be a silver lining if the growing scientific consensus on the effects of the Fukushima spew triggers a paradigm shift. Nuclear accidents, far from being the world-imperiling crises of popular lore, are in fact low-stakes, low-impact events with consequences that are usually too small to matter or even detect. There’s been much talk over the past year about the need to digest “the lessons of Fukushima.” Here’s the most important and incontrovertible one: even when it melts down and blows up, nuclear power is safe.

#### (--) Meltdown damage is nothing—practically no one will die—also disproves their coal internal link:

Will Boisvert, 8/8/2012 (“Fukushima Update: How Safe Can a Nuclear Meltdown Get?”

<http://slackwire.blogspot.com/2012/08/fukushima-update-how-safe-can-nuclear.html>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

Anti-nuke commentators like Arnie Gundersen continue to issue forecasts of a million or more long-term casualties from Fukushima radiation. (So far there have been none.) But the emerging scientific consensus is that the long-term health consequences of the radioactivity, particularly cancer fatalities, will be modest to nil. At the high end of specific estimates, for example, Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel, writing in the nuke-dreading Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, reckons an eventual one thousand fatal cancers arising from the spew.¶ Now there’s a new peer-reviewed paper by Stanford’s Mark Z. Jacobson and John Ten Hoeve that predicts remarkably few casualties. (Jacobson, you may remember, wrote a noted Scientific American article proposing an all-renewable energy system for the world.) They used a supercomputer to model the spread of radionuclides from the Fukushima reactors around the globe, and then calculated the resulting radiation doses and cancer cases through the year 2061. Their result: a probable 130 fatal cancers, with a range from 15 to 1300, in the whole world over fifty years. (Because radiation exposures will have subsided to insignificant levels by then, these cases comprise virtually all that will ever occur.) They also simulated a hypothetical Fukushima-scale meltdown of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in California, and calculated a likely cancer death toll of 170, with a range from 24 to 1400.¶ To put these figures in context, pollution from American coal-fired power plants alone kills about 13,000 people every year. The Stanford estimates therefore indicate that the Fukushima spew, the only significant nuclear accident in 25 years, will likely kill fewer people over five decades than America’s coal-fired power plants kill every five days to five weeks. Worldwide, coal plants kill over 200,000 people each year—150 times more deaths than the high-end Fukushima forecasts predict over a half century.

#### Cyber-attacks are difficult to mount and limited in their damage:

Thomas Rid, **3/20**12 (“Think Again: Cyberwar,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar#6>)

"A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath.

### Space

#### **Efforts to develop a hardened IT infrastructure protects our satellites:**

Defense Industry Daily, 6/14/2011 (“DoD Cybersecurity Spending: Where’s the Beef?” <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/cyber-security-department-defense-spending-06882/>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

In March 2011 testimony external link to the House Armed Services Committee, Alexander said the cyber command plans to develop a hardened IT infrastructure that involves the use of cloud computing and thin-client networks. This would involve the moving of programs and data away from desktops to a centralized configuration that would enable tighter controls over network access and reduce vulnerabilities.¶ Alexander told lawmakers:¶ “This architecture would seem at first glance to be vulnerable to insider threats–indeed, no system that human beings use can be made immune to abuse–but we are convinced the controls and tools that will be built into the cloud will ensure that people cannot see any data beyond what they need for their jobs and will be swiftly identified if they make unauthorized attempts to access data.”¶ Cybersecurity firms could have a role in helping the US Cyber Command implement this hardened IT infrastructure concept, particularly cloud computing and thin-client providers.¶ Contracts have already been awarded by the command to help it establish its current facilities. For example, in 2010 Booz Allen Hamilton received a $14.4 million contract to build the command’s control center, and Integral Systems won a contract external link to provide commercial satellite geolocation services for the command’s Global Satellite Communications Support Center. The center, located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, monitors commercial satellite communication teleports to detect deliberate interference with the satellites.

#### Disad outweighs and turns the case:

#### Time-Frame the negotiations with Iran are going on RIGHT NOW—the plan risks scuttling them by enacting new sanctions on Iran.

#### Magnitude: Our Press TV evidence indicates several escalatory scenarios for nuclear war take place including China & Russia.

#### Probability: Middle East war uniquely likely to escalate—outweighs other escalation risks:

James Russell 2009 (James, Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prosepects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East,” ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

####  (--) The sanctions legislation will spiral into a Middle East war:

Jon Perr, 12/24/2013 (B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran,” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran. On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates: If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence. Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July: "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb." Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come." But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway. Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza. That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." 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A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### A nuclear Iran can’t be deterred:

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If Iran did acquire nuclear weapons, would a containment strategy preserve stability in the Middle East? Some analysts, including Lindsay and Takeyh, argue that although Iran can be aggressive at times, it also regulates its behavior to avoid provoking retaliation. Since the regime is sensitive to costs, the logic goes, it recognizes the dangers of escalation; hence, containment would work. Other analysts argue that Iran's antagonism toward the United States and Israel is so strong and so central to its leaders' legitimacy that Tehran will become more hostile once it has a nuclear arsenal, regardless of the consequences.¶ The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Tehran may not be irrationally aggressive, but its leadership structure and decision-making are opaque. Its rhetoric toward the United States, Israel, and the Arab nations is often inflammatory. And its hostile behavior--including its support for proxies such as Hezbollah, its efforts to subvert its neighbors, and its provocative naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf--could easily trigger a crisis. In short, it is unclear how a nuclear-armed Iran would weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of brinkmanship and escalation and therefore how easily it could be deterred from attacking the United States' interests or partners in the Middle East.

AT waivers

#### (--) Waivers won’t solve:

Trita Parsi, 2/18/2014 (President of the National Iranian American Council, “US-Iran deal: Compromise is key,” <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/us-iran-deal-compromise-key-201421845935181913.html>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

Going forward, Obama will face severe difficulties offering relief on key sanctions such as those on oil and banking, since these are controlled by Congress.¶ Obama can temporarily waive Congressional sanctions, but the utility of waivers is questionable due to the proportionality principle established in the Istanbul talks in the spring of 2012.¶ Reversible Western concessions, the Istanbul talks established, will have to be exchanged for reversible Iranian measures and vice versa. To extract irreversible concessions, similarly irreversible measures have to be offered.¶ Sanctions waivers are fundamentally reversible. They usually last only six months and have to be actively renewed by the president - including by whoever occupies the White House after 2016.

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Hindu Business Line, 2/8/2014 (“Obama signs $950-bn farm bill,”

<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/international/obama-signs-950bn-farm-bill/article5667375.ece>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

US President Barack Obama has signed an agriculture bill worth more than $950 billion, saying the rare product of cooperation in Washington was an example of how the gridlocked US political capital should work.

#### **(--) Political capital is finite—controversial policies eat up good will:**

The Guardian, 9/10/2013 (“Syria: the great distraction,”

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

#### (--) Winners win is wrong -- Obama votes neg

Jackie Calmes, NYTimes, 11/12/12, In Debt Talks, Obama Is Ready to Go Beyond Beltway, mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/legacy-at-stake-obama-plans-broader-push-for-budget-deal.xml

That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies - in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of the presidency at Texas A & M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama's presidency is titled "Overreach," said, "He didn't understand the limits of what he could do."¶ "They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we'd build this advancing-tide theory of legislation," Mr. Edwards said. "And that was very naïve, very silly. Well, they've learned a lot, I think."¶ "Effective leaders," he added, "exploit opportunities rather than create them."¶ The budget showdown is an opportunity. But like many, it holds risks as well as potential rewards.¶ "This election is the second chance to be what he promised in 2008, and that is to break the gridlock in Washington," said Kenneth M. Duberstein, a Reagan White House chief of staff, who voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 and later expressed disappointment. "But it seems like this is a replay of 2009 and 2010, when he had huge majorities in the House and Senate, rather than recognizing that 'we've got to figure out ways to work together and it's not just what I want.' "¶ For now, at least, Republican lawmakers say they may be open to raising the tax bill for some earners. "We can increase revenue without increasing the tax rates on anybody in this country," said Representative Tom Price, Republican of Georgia and a leader of House conservatives, on "Fox News Sunday." "We can lower the rates, broaden the base, close the loopholes."¶ The challenge for Mr. Obama is to use his postelection leverage to persuade Republicans - or to help Speaker John A. Boehner persuade Republicans - that a tax compromise is in their party's political interest since most Americans favor compromise and higher taxes on the wealthy to reduce annual deficits.¶ Some of the business leaders the president will meet with on Wednesday are members of the new Fix the Debt coalition, which has raised about $40 million to urge lawmakers and their constituents to support a plan that combines spending cuts with new revenue. That session will follow Mr. Obama's meeting with labor leaders on Tuesday.¶ His first trip outside Washington to engage the public will come after Thanksgiving, since Mr. Obama is scheduled to leave next weekend on a diplomatic trip to Asia. Travel plans are still sketchy, partly because his December calendar is full of the traditional holiday parties.¶ Democrats said the White House's strategy of focusing both inside and outside of Washington was smart. "You want to avoid getting sucked into the Beltway inside-baseball games," said Joel Johnson, a former adviser in the Clinton White House and the Senate. "You can still work toward solutions, but make sure you get out of Washington while you are doing that."¶ The president must use his leverage soon, some Democrats added, because it could quickly wane as Republicans look to the 2014 midterm elections, when the opposition typically takes seats from the president's party in Congress.

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The Obama administration enters the year locked in a battle with Congress over whether to plow ahead with new economic sanctions against Iran or cautiously wait to see if last year's breakthrough nuclear agreement holds. The new sanctions, widely endorsed by both Republican and Democratic lawmakers, would blacklist several Iranian industrial sectors and threaten banks and companies around the world with being banned from the U.S. market if they help Iran export any more oil. The provisions would only take effect if Tehran violates the interim nuclear deal or lets it expire without a follow-up accord. The House already approved similar legislation last July by a 400-20 vote and would likely pass the new sanctions by an overwhelming margin. But the Obama administration, fearful of squandering a historic diplomatic opportunity to end the nuclear crisis, has succeeded so far in holding off a Senate vote.

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#### (--) Hawks in Congress are still pushing the Iran sanctions bill:

Jason Ditz, 2/19/2014 (staff writer, “Iran Keeping Its Promises, US Admits <http://news.antiwar.com/2014/02/19/iran-keeping-its-promises-us-admits/>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

After months of threats to really stick it to Iran if they renege on the interim P5+1 nuclear deal, US State Department official Wendy Sherman today conceded that Iran has actually done everything they promised to do under the deal.¶ Sherman insisted the US has done everything they promised as well, though since one of their promises was no new sanctions throughout the deal and hawks in Congress are still pushing those sanctions, that remains speculative.

#### (--) Congress is eager to renew the sanctions push:

Laicie Heeley, 2/20/2014 (staff writer, “Progress With Iran as Negotiations Continue in Vienna,” <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21966-progress-with-iran-as-negotiations-continue-in-vienna>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

In exchange for these concessions, Iran will be offered significant sanctions relief, particularly in the oil and financial sectors that have had the most impact on the country's economy. This is likely to be a gradual process contingent upon Iran's continued cooperation. As sanctions are removed, Iran's economy will begin to recover, but only as long as the country complies with its obligations. Were Iran to fail to deliver on any of its promises, Congress lies in wait, ready to reverse any sanctions relief and impose its most crippling legislation to date.

More recent

AT sanctions good

#### (--) We’ll control uniqueness on the sanctions debate: Negotiations are working now—Iran is taking concrete steps to roll back its nuclear program:

Anita Kumar, 1/21/2014 (staff writer, “Iran sanctions eased; uranium work curbed,”

http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national\_world/2014/01/21/iran-sanctions-eased-uranium-work-curbed.html, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

WASHINGTON — Iran has started suspending some of its uranium enrichment as part of a deal between Tehran and world powers to rein in the nation’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of some economic sanctions, an international watchdog says. Negotiators for the nations said they will begin working on a longer-term, more-comprehensive agreement. “These actions represent the first time in nearly a decade that Iran has verifiably enacted measures to halt progress on its nuclear program and roll it back in key respects,” White House spokesman Jay Carney said in a statement. “Taken together, these concrete actions represent an important step forward.”

#### (--) New sanctions UNDERMINE, not enhance US negotiating posture:

Ben Armbruster, 1/6/2014 (staff writer, “Security Experts Ask Senators To Pull Back Iran Sanctions Bill,” http://thinkprogress.org/security/2014/01/06/3122551/crocker-experts-senate-iran-sanctions-bill/, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

The letter’s signatories share that concern and address the argument that lawmakers often make when pushing more sanctions now: the threat of harsh penalties will strengthen the U.S.’s negotiating position. “To the contrary,” the letter says, “Iranian leaders are more likely to see such Congressional action as a violation of the spirit and perhaps the letter of the Joint Plan of Action of November 24, 2013, and to harden rather than soften their negotiating position.” They note that Iranian parliamentarians have already introduced a measure to enrich nearly weapons-grade uranium in response to the Menendez-Kirk bill. “This kind of tit-for-tat spiral threatens to undermine any possibility of curtailing Iran’s nuclear program,” they write. “Should the U.S. Congress decide it must unilaterally seek to add even more burdens now on this complicated and critical process, it is unlikely that the goals of our negotiations can be achieved,” they write, warning that “our other negotiating partners (UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China) would be displeased and would conclude that the US is no longer proceeding in good faith in accord with the Joint Plan of Action. This bill could lead to an unraveling of the sanctions regime that the U.S. and its partners have so patiently built.”

#### Disad outweighs and turns the case:

#### Time-Frame the negotiations with Iran are going on RIGHT NOW—the plan risks scuttling them by enacting new sanctions on Iran.

#### Magnitude: Our Press TV evidence indicates several escalatory scenarios for nuclear war take place including China & Russia.

#### Probability: Middle East war uniquely likely to escalate—outweighs other escalation risks:

James Russell 2009 (James, Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prosepects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East,” ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

####  (--) The sanctions legislation will spiral into a Middle East war:

Jon Perr, 12/24/2013 (B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran,” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

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Laicie Heeley, 2/20/2014 (staff writer, “Progress With Iran as Negotiations Continue in Vienna,” <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21966-progress-with-iran-as-negotiations-continue-in-vienna>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

In exchange for these concessions, Iran will be offered significant sanctions relief, particularly in the oil and financial sectors that have had the most impact on the country's economy. This is likely to be a gradual process contingent upon Iran's continued cooperation. As sanctions are removed, Iran's economy will begin to recover, but only as long as the country complies with its obligations. Were Iran to fail to deliver on any of its promises, Congress lies in wait, ready to reverse any sanctions relief and impose its most crippling legislation to date.

More recent

AT sanctions good

#### (--) We’ll control uniqueness on the sanctions debate: Negotiations are working now—Iran is taking concrete steps to roll back its nuclear program:

Anita Kumar, 1/21/2014 (staff writer, “Iran sanctions eased; uranium work curbed,”

http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national\_world/2014/01/21/iran-sanctions-eased-uranium-work-curbed.html, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

WASHINGTON — Iran has started suspending some of its uranium enrichment as part of a deal between Tehran and world powers to rein in the nation’s nuclear program in return for the lifting of some economic sanctions, an international watchdog says. Negotiators for the nations said they will begin working on a longer-term, more-comprehensive agreement. “These actions represent the first time in nearly a decade that Iran has verifiably enacted measures to halt progress on its nuclear program and roll it back in key respects,” White House spokesman Jay Carney said in a statement. “Taken together, these concrete actions represent an important step forward.”

#### (--) New sanctions UNDERMINE, not enhance US negotiating posture:

Ben Armbruster, 1/6/2014 (staff writer, “Security Experts Ask Senators To Pull Back Iran Sanctions Bill,” http://thinkprogress.org/security/2014/01/06/3122551/crocker-experts-senate-iran-sanctions-bill/, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

The letter’s signatories share that concern and address the argument that lawmakers often make when pushing more sanctions now: the threat of harsh penalties will strengthen the U.S.’s negotiating position. “To the contrary,” the letter says, “Iranian leaders are more likely to see such Congressional action as a violation of the spirit and perhaps the letter of the Joint Plan of Action of November 24, 2013, and to harden rather than soften their negotiating position.” They note that Iranian parliamentarians have already introduced a measure to enrich nearly weapons-grade uranium in response to the Menendez-Kirk bill. “This kind of tit-for-tat spiral threatens to undermine any possibility of curtailing Iran’s nuclear program,” they write. “Should the U.S. Congress decide it must unilaterally seek to add even more burdens now on this complicated and critical process, it is unlikely that the goals of our negotiations can be achieved,” they write, warning that “our other negotiating partners (UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China) would be displeased and would conclude that the US is no longer proceeding in good faith in accord with the Joint Plan of Action. This bill could lead to an unraveling of the sanctions regime that the U.S. and its partners have so patiently built.”

# 1NR PTIX

#### Disad outweighs and turns the case:

#### Time-Frame the negotiations with Iran are going on RIGHT NOW—the plan risks scuttling them by enacting new sanctions on Iran.

#### Magnitude: Our Press TV evidence indicates several escalatory scenarios for nuclear war take place including China & Russia.

#### Probability: Middle East war uniquely likely to escalate—outweighs other escalation risks:

James Russell 2009 (James, Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prosepects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East,” ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

####  (--) The sanctions legislation will spiral into a Middle East war:

Jon Perr, 12/24/2013 (B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran,” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran. On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates: If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence. Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July: "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb." Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come." But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway. Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza. That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback? Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### A nuclear Iran can’t be deterred:

Eric S. Edelman, 2011 (Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “The dangers of NATO a nuclear Iran: the limits of containment,” Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb. 2011, Accessed via General Onefile, 10/16/2013, rwg)

If Iran did acquire nuclear weapons, would a containment strategy preserve stability in the Middle East? Some analysts, including Lindsay and Takeyh, argue that although Iran can be aggressive at times, it also regulates its behavior to avoid provoking retaliation. Since the regime is sensitive to costs, the logic goes, it recognizes the dangers of escalation; hence, containment would work. Other analysts argue that Iran's antagonism toward the United States and Israel is so strong and so central to its leaders' legitimacy that Tehran will become more hostile once it has a nuclear arsenal, regardless of the consequences.¶ The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Tehran may not be irrationally aggressive, but its leadership structure and decision-making are opaque. Its rhetoric toward the United States, Israel, and the Arab nations is often inflammatory. And its hostile behavior--including its support for proxies such as Hezbollah, its efforts to subvert its neighbors, and its provocative naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf--could easily trigger a crisis. In short, it is unclear how a nuclear-armed Iran would weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of brinkmanship and escalation and therefore how easily it could be deterred from attacking the United States' interests or partners in the Middle East.

AT waivers

#### (--) Waivers won’t solve:

Trita Parsi, 2/18/2014 (President of the National Iranian American Council, “US-Iran deal: Compromise is key,” <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/us-iran-deal-compromise-key-201421845935181913.html>, Accessed 2/21/2014, rwg)

Going forward, Obama will face severe difficulties offering relief on key sanctions such as those on oil and banking, since these are controlled by Congress.¶ Obama can temporarily waive Congressional sanctions, but the utility of waivers is questionable due to the proportionality principle established in the Istanbul talks in the spring of 2012.¶ Reversible Western concessions, the Istanbul talks established, will have to be exchanged for reversible Iranian measures and vice versa. To extract irreversible concessions, similarly irreversible measures have to be offered.¶ Sanctions waivers are fundamentally reversible. They usually last only six months and have to be actively renewed by the president - including by whoever occupies the White House after 2016.

AT winners win

#### **(--) Turn is non-unique: Obama got a win on the farm bill:**

Hindu Business Line, 2/8/2014 (“Obama signs $950-bn farm bill,”

<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/international/obama-signs-950bn-farm-bill/article5667375.ece>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

US President Barack Obama has signed an agriculture bill worth more than $950 billion, saying the rare product of cooperation in Washington was an example of how the gridlocked US political capital should work.

#### **(--) Political capital is finite—controversial policies eat up good will:**

The Guardian, 9/10/2013 (“Syria: the great distraction,”

http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

#### (--) Winners win is wrong -- Obama votes neg

Jackie Calmes, NYTimes, 11/12/12, In Debt Talks, Obama Is Ready to Go Beyond Beltway, mobile.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/legacy-at-stake-obama-plans-broader-push-for-budget-deal.xml

That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies - in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a leading scholar of the presidency at Texas A & M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama's presidency is titled "Overreach," said, "He didn't understand the limits of what he could do."¶ "They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we'd build this advancing-tide theory of legislation," Mr. Edwards said. "And that was very naïve, very silly. Well, they've learned a lot, I think."¶ "Effective leaders," he added, "exploit opportunities rather than create them."¶ The budget showdown is an opportunity. But like many, it holds risks as well as potential rewards.¶ "This election is the second chance to be what he promised in 2008, and that is to break the gridlock in Washington," said Kenneth M. Duberstein, a Reagan White House chief of staff, who voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 and later expressed disappointment. "But it seems like this is a replay of 2009 and 2010, when he had huge majorities in the House and Senate, rather than recognizing that 'we've got to figure out ways to work together and it's not just what I want.' "¶ For now, at least, Republican lawmakers say they may be open to raising the tax bill for some earners. "We can increase revenue without increasing the tax rates on anybody in this country," said Representative Tom Price, Republican of Georgia and a leader of House conservatives, on "Fox News Sunday." "We can lower the rates, broaden the base, close the loopholes."¶ The challenge for Mr. Obama is to use his postelection leverage to persuade Republicans - or to help Speaker John A. Boehner persuade Republicans - that a tax compromise is in their party's political interest since most Americans favor compromise and higher taxes on the wealthy to reduce annual deficits.¶ Some of the business leaders the president will meet with on Wednesday are members of the new Fix the Debt coalition, which has raised about $40 million to urge lawmakers and their constituents to support a plan that combines spending cuts with new revenue. That session will follow Mr. Obama's meeting with labor leaders on Tuesday.¶ His first trip outside Washington to engage the public will come after Thanksgiving, since Mr. Obama is scheduled to leave next weekend on a diplomatic trip to Asia. Travel plans are still sketchy, partly because his December calendar is full of the traditional holiday parties.¶ Democrats said the White House's strategy of focusing both inside and outside of Washington was smart. "You want to avoid getting sucked into the Beltway inside-baseball games," said Joel Johnson, a former adviser in the Clinton White House and the Senate. "You can still work toward solutions, but make sure you get out of Washington while you are doing that."¶ The president must use his leverage soon, some Democrats added, because it could quickly wane as Republicans look to the 2014 midterm elections, when the opposition typically takes seats from the president's party in Congress.

AT PC not real

#### (--) Extend our DAWN.com evidence—Obama’s hard push is key to staving off new sanctions against Iran.

#### (--) Obama’s bully pulpit is succeeding in staving off sanctions now:

BRADLEY KLAPPER, 1/9/2014 (staff writer, “Obama, Congress Locked in Iran Sanctions Dispute,” http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/obama-congress-locked-iran-sanctions-dispute-21471744?singlePage=true, Accessed 1/22/2014, rwg)

The Obama administration enters the year locked in a battle with Congress over whether to plow ahead with new economic sanctions against Iran or cautiously wait to see if last year's breakthrough nuclear agreement holds. The new sanctions, widely endorsed by both Republican and Democratic lawmakers, would blacklist several Iranian industrial sectors and threaten banks and companies around the world with being banned from the U.S. market if they help Iran export any more oil. The provisions would only take effect if Tehran violates the interim nuclear deal or lets it expire without a follow-up accord. The House already approved similar legislation last July by a 400-20 vote and would likely pass the new sanctions by an overwhelming margin. But the Obama administration, fearful of squandering a historic diplomatic opportunity to end the nuclear crisis, has succeeded so far in holding off a Senate vote.

Plan splits GOP

#### (--) Hawks in Congress are still pushing the Iran sanctions bill:

Jason Ditz, 2/19/2014 (staff writer, “Iran Keeping Its Promises, US Admits <http://news.antiwar.com/2014/02/19/iran-keeping-its-promises-us-admits/>, Accessed 2/20/2014, rwg)

After months of threats to really stick it to Iran if they renege on the interim P5+1 nuclear deal, US State Department official Wendy Sherman today conceded that Iran has actually done everything they promised to do under the deal.¶ Sherman insisted the US has done everything they promised as well, though since one of their promises was no new sanctions throughout the deal and hawks in Congress are still pushing those sanctions, that remains speculative.

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In exchange for these concessions, Iran will be offered significant sanctions relief, particularly in the oil and financial sectors that have had the most impact on the country's economy. This is likely to be a gradual process contingent upon Iran's continued cooperation. As sanctions are removed, Iran's economy will begin to recover, but only as long as the country complies with its obligations. Were Iran to fail to deliver on any of its promises, Congress lies in wait, ready to reverse any sanctions relief and impose its most crippling legislation to date.

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The letter’s signatories share that concern and address the argument that lawmakers often make when pushing more sanctions now: the threat of harsh penalties will strengthen the U.S.’s negotiating position. “To the contrary,” the letter says, “Iranian leaders are more likely to see such Congressional action as a violation of the spirit and perhaps the letter of the Joint Plan of Action of November 24, 2013, and to harden rather than soften their negotiating position.” They note that Iranian parliamentarians have already introduced a measure to enrich nearly weapons-grade uranium in response to the Menendez-Kirk bill. “This kind of tit-for-tat spiral threatens to undermine any possibility of curtailing Iran’s nuclear program,” they write. “Should the U.S. Congress decide it must unilaterally seek to add even more burdens now on this complicated and critical process, it is unlikely that the goals of our negotiations can be achieved,” they write, warning that “our other negotiating partners (UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China) would be displeased and would conclude that the US is no longer proceeding in good faith in accord with the Joint Plan of Action. This bill could lead to an unraveling of the sanctions regime that the U.S. and its partners have so patiently built.”